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Abstract. There exists a sociocultural function to humour that is geared 
towards maintaining order through a subversion (or inversion) of the more 
serious, structured status quo, and while there is a pragmatic side to the 
dispensation of humour across any given society, humour can also serve a 
fundamentally ontological function in determining and representing a group’s 
identity. Though notions of social organization and culture exist and are 
perpetuated primarily within a group’s literary canon, as espoused for example 
in the privileging of genres such as the epic or the novel as loci of national 
identity, this paper argues that such identities can be just as effectively – if not 
better – constructed through popular representations in humour, especially 
in satirical content found in “ephemeral” mediums such as comic strips. Such 
representations in turn can be mobilized to complement or even dismantle the 
status quo and offer alternative paradigms of understanding national identities 
and cultural affiliations.
Keywords: postcolonial; humour; satire; national identity; Filipino literature; 
popular literature
While François Rabelais once said that “to laugh is proper to man”, in truth, 
laughter is primarily an innate physiological function, underscored by how 
infants and even certain animals have the capacity to do so as a form of emotio-
nal release. On the contrary, humour requires a certain epistemological and 
metalinguistic disposition to think in abstraction, symbols, and irony. Thus, 
while both laughter and humour have undeniable social aspects, humour 
is more “properly human” in that it is the mode that carries the nuances of 
language, culture, and context. 
There are numerous theories of humour, with the most notable being 
“incongruity theories” and “social theories”. Incongruity theories of humour 
focus on the cognitive aspect of humour, specifically the subversion of expec-
tations, whether linguistic/auditory (as in punning), or diegetic (as in irony), 
that lends a narrative or text humorous. Incongruity theories are hinged on 
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the notion that laughter arises from the relationship between two or more 
objects, events, or concepts that are expected to function as elements of a 
single complex signification, but instead appear as disjointed or mismatched. 
Kant emphasizes this quality of surprise and unexpectedness in humour in 
his Critique of Judgment when he claims that “laughter is an affect resulting 
from the sudden transformation of a heightened expectation into nothing” 
(2000: 209). Meanwhile, social theories of humour focus on its necessarily 
inclusionary/exclusionary nature, highlighting how specific elements of 
humour such as language and cultural context serve to foster a semblance of 
social segregation among those who are “in” on the joke, those who are the 
butt of it, and those who do not get it. Social theories of humour emphasize 
how the humorous effect that leads to the inclusionary/exclusionary dynamic 
is hinged not merely on linguistic cleverness, but on the very social and cultural 
context that renders this very incongruity possible in the first place. Both 
theoretical categories point to a possible correlation between humour and 
Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of mythology, in that humour, like mythology, 
provides an ordered and intelligible way with which to experience a chaotic 
reality. Patrick O’Neill observes that “mythical thought […] always progresses 
from the awareness of oppositions towards their resolution [and] this is also 
the most characteristic feature […] of humour” (1990: 104). Through a kind 
of intellectual bricolage that compensates for the inadequacies of traditional 
discourse, humour functions as a coping mechanism for understanding 
uncertainty in reality and a tool for making sense of the contradictory or 
intractable. 
Jeroen Vandaele observes that “the particular problem with [transmitting] 
humour is that humour relies on implicit knowledge… [including] implicit 
cultural schemes (to be breached for incongruous purposes; to be known 
for the purposes of rendering something funny) and has its rules and taboos 
for targeting” (2010: 150). In the Philippines for example, “mother” and 
“martial law” jokes are considered bad taste; in contrast, joking about people 
with disabilities is acceptable. Furthermore, that humour is also reliant 
on metalinguistic communication  – seen in the dynamics of denotation/
connotation, timing, and perhaps even gestures – is important in transmitting 
humorous intent. Because the rules, expectations, and agreements on social 
play are often group- or culture-specific, humour is therefore without doubt a 
distinctly human thing because our symbolic mind, socialized within a specific 
human context, can turn uncertainty, surprise and danger into what we call 
humour. 
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There exists a sociocultural function to humour that is geared towards 
maintaining order through a subversion (or inversion) of the more serious, 
structured status quo, and while there is a pragmatic side to the dispensation 
of humour across any given society, humour can also serve a fundamentally 
ontological function in determining and representing group’s identity. Though 
traditional notions of social or even national identity exist within a group’s 
literary canon, this paper argues that such identities can be as effectively 
constructed through representations in humour, and that such sociocultural 
representations could be mobilized to complement or even dismantle the status 
quo.
I. Traditional Canons: Representing Group Identity in 
National Novels
The national novel has traditionally been the genre used to depict group 
identity in literature, and over the years, the genre has expanded to accom-
modate functions other than pure mimesis. Nowhere do we see such extra-
neous functions more clearly at work than in the dynamics of national canons 
in the realm of world literature, where texts contain contextual import 
of a sociocultural and political nature in their reception and assimilation 
into existing knowledge. The genre of the novel has, in essence, acquired a 
metonymic function as representation of cultural identity. 
But identity itself is not a static concept; it is both a by-product and field of 
contestation among opinions, values, and cultures whose multivocalities are 
not always necessarily harmonic. Identity, therefore, can best be characterized 
as a democratic (and democratizing) construction among stakeholders. 
This pluralistic, rhizomatic view of identity runs counter to the prevailing 
notion that the nation – and correspondingly, its representative literature – is 
monolithic and homogeneous, with the political and intellectual elite as its 
vanguard. Outside the Philippines’ basic education curriculum, for example, 
José Rizal’s national novels Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo are hardly 
referenced as community-defining despite their avowed historical and literary 
significance. What this shows is that texts are entrenched in economies of 
value, or a hierarchization that privileges one discourse over another, either 
because of ethnolinguistic disparities or sociopolitical inequalities. Because 
canonical texts are primarily written to represent an institutional view of 
national identity, there must exist a divergent notion of nation that is located 
extrinsic to this tradition. The national narrative therefore can be said to 
exist as a pliable concept within the contestatory poles of canon, and national 
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novels no longer hold the sole distinction of being the locus of cultural identity. 
Instead, popular texts, especially humorous ones, can be seen as possible fields 
of creating and transmitting a complementary group-view or identity. 
II. The Discourse of Humour and Satire as its Vehicle 
In his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci talks about the concept of the 
“national-popular”, where he discusses why in Italy there was the problem of 
“the non-circulation of artistic literature among the people; and that of the non-
existence of a popular literature” (Gramsci 1985: 206). Gramsci attributes these 
problems to the fact that 
‘writers’ and ‘people’ do not have the same conception of the world. In other 
words the feelings of the people are not lived by the writers as their own, nor 
do the writers have a ‘national educative’ function: they have not and do not set 
themselves the problem of elaborating popular feelings… [Thus] the lay forces 
(intellectuals) have failed in their historical task as educators and elaborators of 
the intellect and moral awareness of the people-nation. They have been incapa-
ble of satisfying the intellectual needs of the people precisely because they have 
failed to represent a lay culture…as was necessary from the national point of 
view, and because they have been tied to an antiquated world, narrow, abstract, 
too individualistic or caste-like. (Gramsci 1985: 207, 211)
 
There exists in Gramsci a recognition of a (supposedly) superior group whose 
tastes are imposed on the (seemingly) unknowing masses, but who are also 
criticized for presenting a narrow view of the milieu. Popular culture then for 
Gramsci is both a meaningful ideological sphere that molds the consciousness 
of subaltern groups through the workings of the intellectual elite, and is also 
thus the venue for contestation for the organic intellectual. Gramsci’s critique 
of the intellectual elite, whose aesthetic tastes and valuations are constantly 
indoctrinated upon those outside it, is suggestive of a balance among the 
state (whose machinery allows the perpetuation of this indoctrination), the 
civil society (the public space where contestation happens), and the private 
sphere (whose response is key to the outcome of indoctrination) (Mascha 
2011: 195). Gramsci’s argument seems to reinforce Raymond Williams’ 
assertion that “culture is ordinary”, a notion that describes a particular way of 
life “which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning 
but also in institutions and ordinary behavior” (1961: 57). These collective 
habits, assumptions, routines, languages, and preferences create a shared 
value system that define the culture of a group, which in turn allow people to 
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organize around the concept of Benedict Anderson’s imagined community. 
Globalization and mass production have multiplied and fragmented forms of 
cultural capital, which has resulted to popular culture becoming “a prime site 
for contestations of value” (Edensor 2002: 16). Civil society then becomes the 
motor of history, for this is “where the meanings and values that can sustain or 
transform society are created” (Jones 2000: 33), and because it is the “location 
of all culture or ‘ethical’ life publicly expressed” (Mascha 2011: 195). Nowhere 
do we see this transformative awareness and dynamic groupthink more acutely 
than in humour, and more specifically, in the sub-realm of satire. 
Defining Boundaries of Group-Think through Satire 
Satire is an example of counter-hegemony because of its function in subverting 
the pervasive discourse in the status quo. As a counter-hegemonic discourse, 
satire operates as a “war of position, since it smoothly degrades official dis-
course by revealing [its] weak aspects and not by actually confronting the 
[dominant discourse]” (Mascha 2011: 196). Texts that employ satire derive 
their humour from a meta-utilization of a particular culture, a system of 
institutions, and frameworks of belief and knowledge that allow such texts to 
function within a dynamic of higher-order discourse. Paul Simpson refers to 
an organic set of frames of references that satirical texts employ in relation to 
a humorous impetus, which “emanates from a perceived disapprobation, by the 
satirist, of some aspect of a potential satirical target” (2003: 8). The satirical 
model of humour is thus configured around a tripartite of discursive subject 
positions that perpetually shift and are constantly negotiated: compared to 
other communicative models that merely focus on the discourse between 
speaker and receiver, satire acknowledges the fundamental importance of the 
satirized, the target attacked or critiqued in the discourse, without whom there 
would be no joke. Thus, the relationship between the satirist (producer) and 
the satiree (receiver) is one of communicative ratification or validation hinged 
on an “ex-collusion” (Simpson 2003: 8) of the satirized, that is, a critique-
objectification of the satirized into the discourse. The satirized is hence drawn 
into the discourse but is excluded from it; the satirized provides the impetus for 
interaction to happen between the satirist and satiree. Insofar as the satirized 
draws from a set of common references, values, and cultural knowledge in 
order to sublimate the satirized into a position of inferiority for the satiree, 
there exists a fair amount of calculated interactive risk in the production and 
transmission of satirical discourse. This satirical relationship is facilitated 
by a discoursal prime, which “activates a putative or real anterior discourse 
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event, mediated intersemiotically… and in this sense is an ‘echoic’ utterance 
to the extent that it is predicated on someone else’s discourse, but over which 
ironic distance is placed through a repositioning of the ostensible speaking 
source of the text” (Simpson 2003: 8–9). The prime, as a framework of general 
knowledge, is engaged in an oppositional relationship with the dialectic 
elements of textual structure, such that irony and humour is produced. This 
relationship creates what Karl Popper calls a “force”, which leads to a resolution 
that embodies a new idea. In his own words, 
the only ‘force’ which propels the dialectic development is, therefore, our deter-
mination not to accept, or to put up with, the contradiction between thesis and 
antithesis. It is not a mysterious force inside these two ideas, not a mysterious 
tension between them, which promotes development – it is purely our decision, 
our resolution not to admit contradictions, which induces us to look for a new 
point of view (Popper 1963: 317). 
Popper seems to be talking about the emergence of congruity amid the 
incongruity, what we can call the humorous “uptake”. For there to be a valid 
uptake, the satiree must be able to see that there is a heuristic aspect to the 
satirical text, that is, that there is an extralinguistic meaning to the text that 
needs to be discovered outside its denotative elements. The satirical method 
can thus be seen as a complex discursive structure into which various other 
techniques (visual, verbal, etc.) may be incorporated.   
The function of satirical humour, especially in the Philippine setting, extends 
beyond entertainment or merely making fun of the satirized. Essentially, satire 
constitutes sites where individuals can (and do) negotiate identities and group 
affiliations; in effect, satire becomes an important solidarity strategy that 
contributes to the construction and reinforcement of complex social identities, 
helping establish and maintain social boundaries and affiliations. Corollary to 
this, satirical humour allows individuals recourse to challenge normative and 
expected behaviours towards the satirized, who are often individuals that come 
from groups of hegemonic importance. According to Gramsci, subaltern groups 
are “potentially capable of being united – of being organized into the ‘people 
versus the power bloc’  – if their separate struggles are connected” (Mascha 
2011: 200–201), and it is this potential unity that allows for such groups to move 
towards self-determinism. Instead of drawing group boundaries based solely on 
class, humour then allows individuals to organize themselves based along so-
called “communities of practice” (Holmes & Stubbe 2003; Holmes & Schnurr 
2005), where norms are “typically negotiated and enacted on a day-to-day basis… 
[and wherein] people dynamically construct and negotiate their membership” 
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(Schnurr & Holmes 2005: 103). These communities of practice are “[aggregates] 
of people who come together around mutual engagement in a behavior. Ways 
of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations  – in short, 
practices – emerge in the course of this mutual behavior” (Eckert & McConnell-
Ginet 1992: 464). While satirical humour constitutes a narrow aspect of a 
community of practice’s shared experience, it is an important one because it 
allows people to organize along lines of mutual engagement towards a joint, 
negotiated enterprise such as social critique, and using a shared repertoire of 
culture, values, experiences, etc. developed over a period of time (Wenger 1998; 
Schnurr & Holmes 2005: 103). Humour thus becomes “one of a wide variety of 
linguistic and pragmatic strategies available [especially] to those ‘out of power’ 
to construct a positive identity, and also to subvert the pervasive influence of the 
dominant group by testing, stretching, and contesting normative boundaries” 
(Vine et al. 2009). In this sense, satire can become an important barometer for 
representing social identities, as well as agendas of communities of practice, that 
predominate and interact at any given time.
Organizing Lines of Belonging in Three Comic Strips
Pol Medina’s Pugad Baboy (Swine’s Nest1) is perhaps the most widely re cognized 
comic strip in the Philippines. Having been in circulation since 1988, the 
comic strip appeared exclusively in the sheets of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
then went digital at online news site Rappler.com in June 2013, before finally 
moving back to serialized print publication in the Philippine Star in March 
2018. The comic strip features a fictional Filipino community composed of 
mostly obese or overweight people and their day-to-day adventures in dealing 
with the idiosyncrasies of Philippine life. Pugad Baboy has carved a niche for 
itself as an important venue for representing the pulse of Filipino domestic 
life, as well as general Filipino sentiments on important social issues. Poverty, 
government corruption, bourgeois sensibilities, celebrity gossip, and even 
popular cul ture are the usual fodder for Pugad Baboy issues. At its core, Pugad 
Baboy demonstrates a strong penchant for social satire and sharp, tongue-in-
cheek witticism directed at figures or events in current events. Primarily, Pugad 
Baboy is known for its commentary on sociopolitical issues, such as corruption 
in the government, as the following strips from volume 55 of Medina’s comics 
show.
1 This and other translations or interpretations of text in Medina’s comic strips that ap-
pear in this article are my own.
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STRIP#1: An overweight senator tells Polgas, an anthropomorphic dog charac-
ter in Pugad Baboy, that he lost weight during Holy Week because he ate fish for 
three consecutive days, which Polgas attributes to the weight-reducing proper-
ties of lean fish (Panel 1). The politician disagrees, saying that during the Holy 
Week, he mainly ate raw fish at a Japanese restaurant, which led him to contract 
explosive diarrhea (Panel 2). He then describes the experience of going to the 
bathroom, much to Polgas’ chagrin and disgust (Panels 3 and 4). 
STRIP#2: Mang Dagul, the owner of Polgas and main character of Pugad 
Baboy, asks the same senator if he believes in karma, citing how the senator’s 
wife has been going through the experiences of being victimized in scams, los-
ing money in casinos, etc. (Panel 1). The senator defends himself by saying that 
the real reason why he takes money from public funds is that his constituents 
keep asking for financial dole-outs (Panels 2 and 3). The senator blames his 
constituents for his corruption, and Mang Dagul breaks the fourth wall by tell-
ing the reader conspiratorially that it’s our [the people’s] fault (Panel 4). 
STRIP#3: Mang Dagul shares his disappointment with Polgas that the Phil-
ippines has been importing rice rather than growing its own, expressing fear 
that the Philippines will run out of food soon because exporting will get too 
expensive (Panels 1 and 2). Another politician then exclaims that he can live off 
of eating more cheaply and sustainably (Panel 3). He then delivers the punch 
line in the last panel, saying he’s willing to eat “Pyoorpuds” (Purefoods, a local 
brand) ham, instead of the more expensive and imported jamon Ibérico. 
In each of these examples, Pugad Baboy author Pol Medina is poking fun at 
the generally accepted view among Filipinos that politicians, especially law-
makers such as senators and congress representatives, are corrupt and out to 
pocket taxpayers’ money. This view is predicated on a highly debated feature 
of the Philippine legislative system, the allocation of the Priority Development 
Assistance Fund (colloquially known as the “pork barrel”) to each senator 
or representative. Disbursing the PDAF (usually benefitting their respective 
districts or pet projects) is essentially a matter of individual legislative 
discretion, and as such has been deeply controversial because of its obvious 
overlap with the executive arm of the government. The PDAF has also been 
widely challenged for its extreme potential for abuse, as was the case in the 
Pork Barrel Scam of 2013, wherein certain senators were alleged to have 
funneled Php 10 billion (Philippine pesos, or $238 million CAD) to various 
dummy contractors and projects. Thus, we see that in the aforementioned 
examples, Pugad Baboy is presenting contestatory and almost belligerent 
views of politicians and their hypocritical stance towards the suffering of 
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the greater majority of Filipinos. The first strip plays on the time-honoured 
custom of skipping red meat during Holy Week, one that is very much observed 
in Catholic Philippines. By depicting that the senator also engages in such a 
religious custom draws him into community of practice with the rest of the 
figures (and presumably us, as readers). Yet this depiction is subverted by 
the revelation that the senator’s consumption of fish, which he uses as a 
base for organizing social affiliation, is disproportionate with the practice of 
the rest of the community, who live humbly and ascetically during Lent. By 
introducing the concept of “explosive diarrhea” that the senator contracted 
while consuming raw fish at a presumably high-end Japanese restaurant, the 
strip is inviting the reader to revel in a semblance of social aggression towards 
the satirized, redrawing the lines of community to ex-collude the politician. 
The first strip is especially poignant because it pokes fun not just at the 
indiscriminate corruption of a politician who lives beyond his means using 
taxpayers’ money, but also exposes the hypocrisy of such politicians who use 
religion to curry favour with the electorate. 
This attitude of patronage is then carried over into the second strip, and 
then makes fun of it through an act of meta-awareness. In the second strip, 
Mang Dagul asks the politician if he believes in karma2, seeing as how his wife 
has recently been incurring a lot of bad luck. Ironically, the instances of bad 
luck that the strip is referring to are, to a great extent, manifestations of poetic 
justice: the pyramiding scam implies they had been engaged in unsustainable 
and corrupt business practices; being victimized by a snatcher implies f launting 
one’s extravagant lifestyle in public so as to attract petty theft; and losing 
money in casinos implies vice and general misuse of resources. The senator 
then tries to justify his corruption by attributing it to his constituents’ need for 
dole-outs, as implied in Panel 3 by the triple juxtaposition of petty expenses 
that he claims he uses taxpayers’ money on (funeral expenses, passenger fares) 
with valid public needs (medicine, hospitalization) and his family’s personal 
expenditures (in Panel 2, he talks about how every one of his family members 
needs a house, cars, and jewelry). In the last panel, the visual representation 
of Mang Dagul can be interpreted two ways: he is looking conspiratorially 
2 The concept of karma in the Philippines is different from the Buddhist or Hindu one. 
The main difference lies in how it is generally thought of as incurring good or bad luck 
immediately or within one’s life depending on one’s acts, as opposed to the traditional 
belief that one’s karma is ref lected in the manner of one’s reincarnation. Thus, the 
various instances of the senator’s wife illustrated in the strip (e.g., being victimized in a 
pyramiding scam, getting mugged, losing money in a casino) are immediate “payback” 
effects of their corruption.  
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at Polgas, or looking straight at the reader of the strip. Either way, he is 
sarcastically self-deprecating when he says, “Oh, it’s our fault after all”. This 
strip focuses our attention on the inherent practices of patronage politics in the 
Philippines, a very real phenomenon that is aggravated by the presence of the 
PDAF. In invoking this issue in the strip, the author is commenting on a f law of 
the community of practice, manifested in the social acceptance of patriarchal 
benefaction. The meta-awareness of Mang Dagul, however, delineates between 
those who are presumably aware of the issue and those who perpetuate it, and 
highlights the socially discursive aspect of this political phenomenon.
In the third strip, Mang Dagul laments the import policies of the country 
as he expresses wariness about the state of agriculture in the Philippines, 
punctuated by the fact that no one wants to be a farmer anymore (Panel 1). 
This points to two key cultural stereotypes held by many Filipinos: first, 
that foreign cultures and goods are superior to local ones, hence the presence 
of a strong mentality of materialism for all things foreign; second, that blue 
collar jobs such as farming are backward and unmodern, and are therefore 
undesirable career paths. The author thus satirizes communities of practice 
defined by such pseudo-bourgeoisie preferentiality in the third comic strip 
by using the politician as representative of such communities. In the strip, 
the senator claims a quasi-affiliation with the “masses” by mentioning how he 
can also survive on local and presumably cheaper products: he mentions the 
word “dildil”, which literally means “make do”, and is usually used in the phrase 
“mag-dildil ng asin”, to make do with eating salt over rice (the phrase points 
to eating in extreme poverty, or having nothing to eat rice with except salt). 
However, the politician subverts this expectation of “eating salt with rice” by 
invoking the colonialist mentality previously mentioned: substituting salt with 
something equally salty but undoubtedly more expensive and bourgeois: ham. 
The strip satirizes the politician in three ways: first, for making concessions to 
maintain this quasi-affiliation, i.e., eating local ham instead of imported ham; 
second, for bastardizing the pronunciation of the local brand (“Purefoods” to 
“Pyoorpuds”), indicating that expensive taste does not necessarily equate to 
class (the accented mispronunciation as indicative of being pedestrian or trying 
too hard to be bourgeois); and third, for trying to align himself with the masses 
in an act of quasi-affiliation yet proving unable to adhere himself to the shared 
values and identity of the said community of practice (poverty, simplicity, etc.). 
In each of these examples, we can see that the author employs satirical 
humour in order to draw the boundaries of certain communities of practice, 
in a deliberate attempt at demonstrating the inclusion-exclusion dynamic. 
These communities of practice largely intersect, as in the lines demarcating 
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middle class-lower class, politician-electorate, or socially aware-apathetic. 
It is interesting to note that while the politicians are the most overtly 
satirized group in these strips, they are not the only one. The middle class, 
the electorate, and other groups are all fair game. Depending on the level of 
initiation into the shared sociocultural values or experiences, or the level of 
sophistication the reader has regarding humor norms, the comics negotiate 
across various communities of practice, and convey aggression on various 
levels and with varying degrees of intensity, with politicians bearing the 
brunt. The humorous elements allow the satirees to “manage their ‘sociality 
rights’ – the social expectancies and concerns over fairness, consideration, and 
inclusion in the group” (Schnurr and Holmes 2009: 115). Humour also allows 
for the attenuation of criticism towards the satirized. These multiple levels of 
interdiscursivity help us understand various ways in which humour contributes 
“in particular to the construction of power and distance relationships 
and particular social identities in [society, while also assisting] people in 
challenging and contesting…interactional norms” (Schnurr and Holmes 2009) 
prevalent around them. Through the discoursal construction of the satirical 
target through the collusion of shared social, cultural, and linguistic norms, 
satire is “far removed from the rarefied, ossified texts that characterize many of 
its “classical” components…, [and it is] conceptualized… as a form of dynamic 
social action which has palpable social and interactive consequences” (Simpson 
2003: 187). One of these, of course, is the negotiation of a group mentality 
through contestations and applications of shared normative values.    
III. Defining Group Identity Through Humour 
Despite the organic representation of shared values and lines of community 
identity in popular texts, these have remained by and large stigmatized as 
lacking the necessary capital to be properly representative of certain cultural 
milieu or heritage. Theories of nationalism abound, yet most of these theories 
do not explore the more mundane aspects of the nation: things that exist in the 
day-to-day spaces of the popular. Dominant theories are primarily built upon 
an examination of cultural elements that exist as part of the “high” tradition, 
or what Edensor terms as “reified notions of culture” (2002: vi), which exist as 
a narrow aspect of the nation-space, and can be seen as a counterpoint to the 
changing nature of the popular. This changing nature is codified in one of the 
somewhat pejorative terms used to describe popular literature – “ephemera” – 
a term that discounts the dynamic, multiple, and f luid nature of national 
representation. Accordingly, these multitudinous artifacts ref lect the formation 
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and representation of culture as much as the literature of the intellectual 
elite, if we accept Bennett’s assertion that cultural identity is made up of 
“practices, institutions, and systems of classification through which there are 
inculcated in a population particular values, beliefs, competencies, routines of 
life and habitual forms of conduct” (1998: 28). In short, in dealing with the 
construction of a group identity, there must be an acknowledgment of the 
agency of consumers of culture insofar as their choices, purchases, reception, 
interpretations, appropriations, and uses of such cultural elements function as 
essential factors in making meaning and constructing identity (Storey 2010: 
72). Janice Radway argues that there can be an increase in “articulating the 
differences between the repressive imposition of [bourgeois, elitist] ideology 
and oppositional practices that, though limited in their scope and effect, at 
least dispute or contest the control of ideological forms” (1987: 221–222), 
reinforcing the idea that culture is contingent upon contestation and synthesis. 
The dialectic relationships between “elite” and “grassroots”, “structure” 
and (consumer) “agency”, “resistance” and “incorporation” highlight the con-
cept of hegemony that Gramsci introduces in his works. As Storey notes, “a 
consumer, situated in a specific social context, always confronts a ‘text’ in its 
material existence as a result of particular conditions of production… [but] 
in the same way, a ‘text’ is confronted by a consumer, situated in a specific 
social context, who appropriates as culture, and ‘produces in use’ the range 
of possible meanings the ‘text’ can be made to bear [which] cannot just be 
read off from the materiality of the text, or from the means or relations of 
its production” (2010: 5). Culture therefore cannot be pinned down to mere 
textuality or mere ideology; reception and the ensuing appropriation of such 
meaning into everyday life become the backbone for nation: something that 
we can find in the dialectic force of satirical humour. In short, meanings 
gleaned from and represented in texts do not just exist in their materiality, 
but are made meaningful in the dynamics of discourse. Foucault emphasizes 
that these discourses can be institutionalized by those in power to make 
their way of knowing circulate discursively in the world, effectively creating 
“regimes of truth” (Storey 2010: 6), of which national canons are one example. 
Like all constructs, however, this regime can be challenged through a critical 
evaluation not just of the texts in themselves, but also of the power relations 
that inform the negotiation and ritualization of the realities represented in such 
texts. It is therefore not enough to assume that “ordinary people – the masses – 
consume because they have been infected with artificial wants dreamed up 
by the international league of producers, [nor would it be adequate to] treat 
[consumption] as a residual category – what people do when they are blocked 
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from nobler activities like philanthropy, meaningful politics, and becoming 
mature” (Storey 2010: 139). Instead, credence must be given to popular 
literature as resistance texts whose “production in use”, ideological effect, and 
incorporation can all provide an alternative and complementary view for the 
construction of the nation. 
While we can concede that canonical texts remain dominant, it is in-
teresting to note that outside the academia, these are texts that do not find 
them selves within the transactional paradigm of general consumption, high-
lighting the reality that “people’s engagement with the world of com modities 
[of which popular texts are part] utilizes shifting frames of reference” (Edensor 
2002: 113), as shown in how consumers may be drawn to “unintelligent” 
popular commodities while acknowledging certain exemplary national pro-
ducts. These shifting frames of reference allow us to see national taste, culture, 
and identity as unfixed elements within the domestic space, and emphasize how 
the sociocultural imaginary is an exercise of agency in dialogue with existing 
ideological structures of selfhood. 
IV. Conclusion 
Johannes Fabian contends that cultural critics should be wary of reducing the 
popular to a mere numbers game, especially since “it is easy to qualify, perhaps 
dismiss, such a critique of culture as populist, that is motivated by political, 
even demagogic interests...[but] political, partisan commitment is not what 
ultimately gives strength to arguments based on the study of popular culture…
[instead] the strength of popular culture derives from the fact that it is an 
ongoing process, that power is constantly established, negated, reestablished” 
(Fabian 1998: 131; 133). It must not deny unity or purity where they are real; 
instead, “they must be rejected where they become criteria defining what 
counts as real” (Fabian 1998: 132). Our understanding of social satire, humour, 
and popular culture in general as the possible habitus of group identity must 
account for dialectics because group identity itself is constantly f luid, changing, 
and historical (i.e., existing within a temporal-spatial context). In many 
humour situations, the intellect, like the artist, f luctuates back and forth among 
multiple possibilities, and the laughable becomes a link with the transcendental, 
“measuring the finite no longer against the equally finite but against the infinite 
and finding the contrast infinitely ludicrous” (O’Neill 1990: 43). As Vine et 
al. note, “boundary-marking humor…constructs and reinforces cultural 
identity… [and through it,] individuals shape and reshape identity… [Humor 
thus becomes] a f lexible discourse strategy, which can be manipulated in a wide 
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variety of ways” (2009: 126; 128). In trying to locate communitarian values 
in popular texts, we must engage three important factors: changing cultural 
sensibilities ref lected in content, multiplicity in forms, and development of 
linguistic conventions.
These factors introduce certain difficulties in trying to reconcile popular 
culture with national identity. First, because popular literature (and satirical 
humour especially) represents dynamic sociocultural sensibilities and changes 
in linguistic conventions, we must also recognize that the notion of identity 
that informs such literature must also remain pliable and f luid. If identity is 
negotiated, it is negotiated within the boundaries of social and historical 
phenomena that constantly invite us to apply or modify our values and norms. 
Second, the reality of having multiple group identities representing diverse but 
coexisting cultures is apparent; each individual, as we have seen, negotiates 
his or her social realities across various communities of practice, which in 
themselves overlap and turn in on each other. Lastly, this calls into question 
the notion of canon itself, and whether such a categorization is really nothing 
more than a necessary fiction, especially in the context of fragmentary contexts. 
Humour, and satire specifically, annihilates not the individual, but the infinite, 
through the contrast with the status quo and the ideal. In the presence of this 
infinite fragmentation and incongruity, meaning and identity are yet to be 
determined, and so our laughter is both melancholy and great: something that 
Baudelaire touches upon when he claims that “laughter is likewise a token of 
the essentially contradictory nature of the human condition, torn between 
infinite grandeur and infinite misery” (O’Neill 1990: 44). Ultimately, these 
are tensions that need to be contended with in making sense of the dynamics 
of canon with counter-canon (or perhaps sub-canon?) in order to arrive at a 
dynamic stratum of identity. Looking at satire, and humour in general, merely 
opens an alternative horizon for us to arbitrate who we are, what we’re about, 
and where we as a group can go. 
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